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SOM-theme B   Market and interactions between firms
$%675$&7
This article reports the results of an empirical study focusing on the relationship between
the relative dependence asymmetry of partners in a joint venture, the level and intensity of
conflict between the partners, the level of trust and norms of exchange between the
partners, and the performance of the joint venture. Having interviewed several executives
and administrating a survey, we found evidence that the level of conflict is, to a large
extent, explained by the level of trust and norms of exchange between the partners. The
performance of the joint venture is influenced by the norms of exchange. This indicates that
companies should concentrate on trust and the norms of exchange with the partner to
enhance the joint venture performance.
2,QWURGXFWLRQ
The international joint venture is one strategic alternative in today’s highly
competitive global environment, and the study of joint ventures has attracted
considerable interest among academic researchers and managers. Joint ventures
enable firms to bring in expertise and resources from other companies and remain
strategically flexible (Harrigan 1986). According to Contractor and Lorange (1988:
6), a joint venture is a co-operative arrangement with a high level of organisational
interdependence. If the level of interdependence is too low, the joint venture is
unlikely to survive difficult times. Ongoing viability of the joint venture rests on
the continuing mutual dependence of the partners (Powell 1990).
For companies it proved to be difficult to manage the interdependence of joint
ventures. This is illustrated by the high failure rate of joint ventures, approaching
50% (Cullen et al. 1995). Researchers cite low profitability, erosion of
complementarity and strategic objectives, and cultural differences as reasons for
attrition (Contractor & Lorange 1988). Other research indicates that a firm’s
dependence on its partner increases conflict and the partner’s use of coercion
(Kumar et al. 1995). Anderson and Weitz (1989) provided empirical evidence that
asymmetric dependence relationships are more dysfunctional, less stable, and less
trusting than symmetric relationships. Asymmetric dependence also influences
interfirm trust and norms of fair exchange, sentiments that have been identified as
critical in the development of long-term relationships (Dwyer et al. 1987, Kumar et
al. 1995). A good relationship between the partners, characterised by a low level of
conflict and a high level of trust and norms of exchange will positively influence
the performance of the joint venture (Madhok 1995).
Given the importance of interdependence and its possible effect on the joint
venture performance, we explore how the focal company’s perception of
interdependence asymmetry affects the development of conflict, trust and norms of
exchange and consequently performance. The joint ventures in this study consisted
of joint ventures between a Dutch and a Dutch or foreign partner. We define a joint
venture as a discrete entity created by two or more legally distinct organisations,
each of which contributes less than 100 percent of its assets and actively




The interdependence structure in a joint venture encompasses each firm’s
dependence and the degree of interdependence asymmetry between the firms.
According to the literature, two important factors create perceptions of
dependence: 1) the importance or criticality of resources provided by the source
firm, and 2) the number of alternative sources available to the target firm of the
needed resources (Andaleeb 1995). Social exchange theory suggests that
individuals engage in exchange because they expect doing so to be rewarding (Blau
1964). It follows that an organisation will seek to build a relationship with others
when it perceives a need for resources and support from other organisations
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). With the initiation of the exchange, dependence
relations are expected to result.
7KHHIIHFWRILQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRQFRQIOLFW
Many researchers have concluded that conflict is inherent to any form of
relationship and to joint ventures in particular (Bucklin & Sengupta 1993, Johnson
et al. 1993) and/or are due to the inherent interdependencies between the partners
(Mohr & Spekman 1994). The source of conflict might range from day-to-day
activities to more strategically matters (Hyder 1988). Conflict exists when a partner
in a joint venture perceives that the behaviour of the other partner prevents or
impedes it from achieving its goals (Stern & El-Ansary 1992).
To understand the effect of interdependence asymmetry on conflict, we draw on
bilateral deterrence theory (Bacharach & Lawler 1981). Bilateral deterrence theory
asserts that increasing interdependence asymmetry is associated with higher levels
of aggression and conflict by both parties although based on different motives
(Cook & Emerson 1978). As the interdependence becomes more asymmetric, the
relative powerful partner has increasingly less motivation to avoid conflict.
Retaliation becomes less likely and less damaging, because the firm can inflict
proportionally more serious damage on the dependent partner than it would suffer
in return. Increasing interdependence asymmetry reduces the structural
impediments that inhibit the more powerful firm’s opportunistic behaviour and
self-serving exercises of power.
Also the dependent partner is more inclined to engage in conflict. Because the
relatively dependent partner increasingly expect to be exploited, regardless its
4behaviour, it is more likely to engage in a pre-emptive strike or rebellion against
the more powerful partner (Kumar et al. 1995). Thus, the bilateral deterrence
theory suggests that both the more powerful partner and its weaker partner are
increasingly likely to engage conflict as the relationship becomes more
asymmetric.
+\SRWKHVLV $V WKH LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH DV\PPHWU\ LQ D MRLQW YHQWXUH
UHODWLRQVKLSLQFUHDVHVFRQIOLFWLQFUHDVHV
7KHHIIHFWRILQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRQWUXVW
The need for trust between partners in a joint venture has been identified as an
important element of a long-term joint venture relationship (Parkhe 1993, Inkpen &
Birkenshaw 1993, Madhok 1995). Trust provides parties the possibility of
governing risks in transactions. According to Powell (1990), trust is important
because it reduces complex realities more quickly and economically than
prediction, authority or bargaining. High trust between the partners of a joint
venture is conducive to co-ordinative behaviour, whereas low trust leads to
competitive behaviour (Dabholkar et al. 1994). Long-term relationships and trust
encourage the development of exchange norms, which lead to effective
communication, sharing of information and joint pay-offs (Dwyer et al 1987) and
might create a strong social bond (Han 1992). Therefore, a high level of trust and
norms of exchange might be crucial for joint venture success (Beamish 1988).
In the social psychology and distribution channel literature, there seems to be a
consensus that trust encompasses two essential elements: trust in the partners’
credibility and trust in the partners’ benevolence (Ganesan 1994, Geyskens &
Steenkamp 1995, Kumar et al. 1995). Credibility can be defined as the belief that
the partner stands by its word, fulfils promised role obligations and is sincere
(Ganesan 1994, Morgan & Hunt 1994, Geyskens & Steenkamp 1995). Credibility
is more or less based on prior behaviour. Benevolence is defined as the belief that
one’s partner is interested in the firm’s welfare and will not take unexpected
actions which will negatively impact the firm (Anderson & Narus 1990, Andaleeb
1992, Ganesan 1994). A benevolent partner is motivated by a concern for the well
being of the relationship itself and will not improve its own welfare at the expense
of its partners’ interest (Geyskens & Steenkamp 1995).
In an asymmetric relationship, the powerful partner does not need to cultivate its
partner’s trust (Kumar et al. 1995). It can use its power to obtain its partner’s co-
5operation. The dependent partner will fear potential exploitation by its partner and
is therefore not inclined to trust its partner. Therefore, partners will focus on
monitoring their partners behaviour and input for possible signs of exploitation.
Anderson and Weitz (1989) provided evidence that in asymmetric interdependence
relationships, the relationships are less trusting than in symmetric relationships.
Thus, as the interdependence asymmetry increases, conditions become more
aversive to the development of trust (Kumar et al. 1995).
+\SRWKHVLV $V LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH DV\PPHWU\ LQ D MRLQW YHQWXUH
LQFUHDVHVWUXVWGHFUHDVHV
7KHHIIHFWRIWUXVWRQWKHQRUPVRIH[FKDQJH
Norms of exchange are expectations about behaviour that are at least partially
shared by a group of decision-makers (Heide & John 1992: 34). According to
Dwyer et al. (1987), norms will be the grounded rules for future exchanges and can
serve as a general protective device against deviant behaviour of the partner
(Stinchombe 1986). Norms can be seen as a mutual investment in the relationship
and therefore increase the exit barrier. There is evidence that norms of exchange
are a multidimensional construct in the sense that each dimension may relate to
particular kinds of behaviour. Heide and John (1992) have concentrated on three
dimensions: flexibility, information exchange and solidarity. Flexibility is defined
as a bilateral expectation of willingness to make adaptations as circumstances
change (Heide & John 1992). The partners are willing to accept smooth alterations
in practices and policies in the light of unforeseen or changing conditions.
Information exchange is defined as a bilateral expectation that parties will
proactively and voluntarily provide information useful to the partner (Heide &
John 1992). Thus, exchange of information refers to the nature and timeliness of
information sharing by the exchange partners and is seen as a necessary pre-
condition for a successful joint venture relationship (Inkpen & Birkenshaw 1994).
Solidarity is defined as a bilateral expectation that there is a common interest and
feeling that a high value is placed on the relationship (Heide & John 1992).
Solidarity represents a safeguard to a company because it deters the partner from
using decision-making control in a way that would be detrimental to the
relationship as a whole. The partners will focus on the joint venture rather than on
individual transactions (Pilling et al. 1994).
6The norms of exchange are influenced by trust. If the focal company trusts its
partner, the focal company will be more willing to react flexibly to changing
conditions or demands of the partner (Madhok 1995). There will be a higher level
of flexibility and tolerance in trusting relationships than in relationships with low
levels of trust (Madhok 1995). Trusting relationships are especially important in
the ambiguous situations that are often characteristic to joint ventures. If the norms
of exchange are high, a company will have a feeling that the behaviour of the
partner is in the interest of the joint venture as a whole and not only in the interest
of the partner’s own company. According to Powell (1990) and åsson and
Johansson (1988), trust leads to a more rapid flow of information exchange and a
higher level of open communication. Trust will create a perceived supportive
climate (Geyskens & Steenkamp 1995). Relationships characterised by trust are so
highly valued by the partners, that the partners will have a strong desire to continue
these relationships (Granovetter 1985). We therefore hypothesise:
+\SRWKHVLV ,IWUXVWLQFUHDVHVQRUPVRIH[FKDQJHLQFUHDVH
7KHHIIHFWRIWUXVWDQGQRUPVRIH[FKDQJHRQFRQIOLFW
In their meta-analysis on trust, Geyskens et al. (1998) provide evidence for a strong
and negative effect of trust on conflict. Madhok (1995) argued that building trust
could be seen as the creation of a stock of goodwill from which an actor can draw
when the need arises. Trust increases the tolerance for conflict and makes conflict
less intense. Trust reduces friction. Andaleeb (1992) and Håkansson and Johanson
(1988) also found that relationships characterised by a high level of trust lead to a
low level of conflict. This suggests a negative relationship between trust and
conflict.
+\SRWKHVLV ,IWUXVWLQFUHDVHVFRQIOLFWGHFUHDVHV
We posit that the level of the norms of exchange has a negative effect on the
intensity and frequency of conflicts in the joint venture, i.e., high norms of
exchange will result in a low level of conflicts. We think that if the norms are high,
the partners will see conflict, in most cases, as functional. They do not really
perceive the in opinion as conflicts. The partners know that there are always some
misunderstandings or differences in opinion in a joint venture relationship. They
accept that. In a relationship characterised by a high level of norms of exchange,
conflicts will not be very intense. The partners know that they both have the
intention to solve the “conflict” in a rational and, for both partners, satisfactory
7way. The partners know that they each have the best intention with regard to the
joint venture. Through a process of open communication and with a flexible
attitude, the problems can be solved. In a joint venture with high norms of
exchange, there will also be less conflict. The partners in such a joint venture do
not want to engage in conflict because that might harm the good co-operation
(Johnson et al. 1993). In a joint venture with a low level of norms of exchange,
partners do not have that flexible attitude and might not show solidarity with the
other partner. They might be willing to engage in a more serious and intense
conflict to defend their own position. Thus, we hypothesise:
+\SRWKHVLV ,I WKH OHYHO RI QRUPV RI H[FKDQJH LQFUHDVHV FRQIOLFW
GHFUHDVHV
7KHHIIHFWRIFRQIOLFWDQGQRUPVRIH[FKDQJHRQSHUIRUPDQFH
Norms of exchange will have a positive effect on joint venture performance. For an
effective collaboration, flexibility is necessary to react to changing conditions
(Lorange & Probst 1987, Madhok 1995). A high level of flexibility allows ongoing
planning and continuous adjustments of obligations between the partners (Boyle et
al. 1992). The expectation of getting all known and relevant information on an
ongoing basis enables the partners to better cope with the vulnerability associated
with transferring decision–making control to the partner (Heide & John 1992).
When there is a norm of solidarity in the joint venture relationship, the partners
will take the position of the other partner into account in their decision making.
The partners will not force the other partners to accept certain decisions. If
solidarity is present, then the partners will be more positive about the co-operation.
Higher norms also result in a lower monitoring and administration costs and
therefore increase the economic performance. We hypothesise:
+\SRWKHVLV 7KHUH LV D SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ QRUPV RI
H[FKDQJHDQGWKHMRLQWYHQWXUHRYHUDOOSHUIRUPDQFH
7KHHIIHFWRIFRQIOLFWRQSHUIRUPDQFH
The effect of conflict between the partners on joint venture performance is widely
investigated and, almost without exception, negative. Conflict makes co-operation
difficult, and without co-operation, the achievement of the goals would be nearly
impossible (Johnson et al. 1993). In a joint venture with much conflict, the partners
will focus more on closely monitoring the relationship because each partner is
8afraid that its interests are not (or not fully) taken into account. Also, the conflicts
have to be resolved. This costs precious management time. Thus, the costs of the
co-operation increase when there is conflict. As a result, the economic performance
of the joint venture will decrease and the benefits (revenues minus costs) for the
partners will be lower (Bucklin & Sengupta 1993). Conflict will also have a
negative effect on the satisfaction of the partner. Conflict erodes satisfaction
because participants in the joint venture may be unable to keep up morale and
function effectively on a day-to-day basis in such a dysfunctional situation
(Johnson et al. 1993).




The data for this study were obtained through a questionnaire. We used three
selection criteria to construct our research sample: time period, parent nationality,
and number of participants.
The first criterion was an attempt to capture the recent growth of JVs (Beamish &
Delios 1997). JVs that were founded during the period from 1989-1994 were
selected. By looking at the foundation date, we included also JVs that were
terminated at the time of our study. The second criterion allowed us to focus on the
Dutch partners of the international JV. Questionnaires were sent only to the Dutch
partner(s) of the JV because of time, funding, and access constraints. Finally, we
concentrated on (Dutch) JVs with only two partners, since a majority (80%) of the
JVs are between two partners (Jagersma & Bell 1992). It can be expected that JVs
with more than two partners will face other problems. Also, prior research has
primarily focused on two-partner JVs (see e.g. Geringer & Hebért 1991, Yan &
Gray 1994, Glaister & Buckley 1998).
Data collection proceeded in three phases. First, we developed a sampling frame of
JVs that were founded. This data was gained primarily from announcements of
starting JVs in “Het Financieele Dagblad”, annual reports of Dutch companies
registered at the Dutch stock exchange, and the “Fusie and Overname disk” of
Delwel (1993, 1994). This process resulted in a sample of 319 JVs with 393 Dutch
partners. Second, the companies were contacted to check the information and to
9obtain the name of an executive in each firm that was likely to be able to complete
the survey for the particular JV. Third, after screening these JVs and contacting the
parent companies, the sample was decreased to 242 Dutch JV partners, to whom
we sent the questionnaire1. A reminder was sent to non-respondents and finally 95
executives responded (39%). Eighteen responses were not useable because data
were missing, the JV involved more than two partners, or the JV was formed
outside of our research time period, leaving 77 useable responses (32%). The
majority of the joint ventures were formed with partners from Europe (47)
followed by America (12) and Asia (9). The motives of joint venture formation are
amongst others market access and local knowledge (58%), risk reduction (26%),
and economies of scale (20%). A total of 47 focal companies are in the
manufacturing sector, 19 in services and 12 in the rest (like non-profit). For the
sample as a whole, 60 joint ventures were still in existence at the moment of the
survey, while 18 joint ventures had been terminated. The average duration was 3.2
years.
Possible non-response bias was examined by comparing early and late respondents
(Armstrong & Overton 1977). We found no significant difference (p>.05) between
early and late respondents for any of our constructs, which suggests that non-
response bias was not a problem.
0HDVXUHV
For measuring the interdependence asymmetry, we made a distinction between the
resource needs and the availability of alternative sources of the needed resources.
The resource needs dimension was measured by listing 9 possible resource
contributions by the partners (based on Contractor & Lorange 1988). The
respondents were asked to assess the importance of each resource contribution for
the success of the JV and to estimate the relative contribution of each partner. By
multiplying the importance of the contribution by the relative contributions of the
partners and equally weighting each type of resource contribution, a score was
constructed for the overall relative contribution of the partners.
The availability of the alternatives refers to the number and attractiveness of
alternative partners a party may have and is based on Heide and John (1988) and
                                                     
1Some joint ventures were never founded, the parent company did not exist anymore, the
company was not willing to cooperate, or the company filled in only one questionnaire
(some companies founded more than 20 joint ventures in this period).
10
Ganesan (1994). It is measured by three items (a high score implies few
alternatives). We asked for the availability of the alternative partners for the focal
company as well, to give an indication of the partners’ position. By subtracting the
focal companies’ scores from the partners’ scores, we got an indication of the
relative dependence position. Both dimensions were equally weighted to get an
overall score for interdependence asymmetry. We took the absolute value of this
score to get a score for the balance in the relationship.
The conflict measure is based on Habib (1987). He distinguishes two dimensions,
frequency of conflict and the intensity of conflict. We used 7 items. By multiplying
the two dimensions we get an overall score for conflict.
Our definition of trust encompasses two essential dimensions: credibility and
benevolence. The scale for measuring credibility was based on Kumar et al. (1995)
and Ganesan (1994). For measuring benevolence, we used the scale of Kumar et al.
(1995). For measuring the trust concept, it was decided to equally weight the scores
of credibility and benevolence, in order to get an overall score on the level of trust.
A high score on this construct implies a high level of trust between the partners.
We defined norms of exchange as expectations about behaviour that are at least
partially shared by a group of decision-makers. Norms of exchange are measured
by three dimensions: flexibility, information exchange and solidarity. The measure
is based on Heide & John (1992). Each dimension is equally weighted in order to
get an overall score. A high score on this construct implies a high level of norms of
exchange.
We define performance as the extent to which the objectives are achieved. Our
perceptual measure of  performance encompasses financial as well as operational
measures (Cullen et al. 1995). The measure addressed whether the JV met or
exceeded expectations concerning profitability, growth, market penetration, and
overall performance. An overall score on JV performance was gained by taking the
mean of the items scores, resulting in an overall score on performance ranging
from 1 (poor performance) to 5 (good performance).
’DWD$QDO\VLV
We followed the two-step approach in analysing our data (Anderson & Gerbing
1988, 1992, Fornell & Yi 1992). In the first step, we tested the validity and reliability
of the constructs (see Steenkamp and Van Trijp (1991) for the procedure we
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followed2). This analysis involved the measures of trust (benevolence and
credibility), norms of exchange and performance3. Interdependence and conflict were
not included in this analysis because they were conceptualised as formative indicators
or multidimensional composite indices (Bollen & Lennox 1991, Kumar et al. 1995).
Based on the formative properties of these measures, conventional validation
methods based on association are not appropriate (Bollen & Lennox 1991). In the
second step of the analysis, the structural model was tested.
5HVXOWV
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviation, and correlations between the
dependent and independent variables. To test the structural model, Lisrel 8 was
used (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1996). We used the covariance matrix as input matrix
and Maximum likelihood as estimation procedure.
Table 1: Correlation matrix
Variables mean std 1 2 3 4 5
1 Asymm of Dependence 1.66 1.29 1.00
2 Conflict 6.37 3.90 .08 1.00
3 Trust 3.39 .86 -.21* -.66*** 1.00
4 Norms 3.61 .85 -.16 -.70*** .74*** 1.00
5 Performance 3.07 1.08 -.08 -.47*** .42*** .53*** 1.00
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
The model is presented in Figure 1. The overall fit of the model must be evaluated
before individual relationships can be estimated for hypotheses testing. The model
had a statistically nonsignificant chi-square; 2.85 df=3 (p=.42), suggesting that the
                                                     
2
 In the Confirmatory Factor Analysis, we used the maximum likelyhood estimation with
the covariance matrix as input matrix (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1996). Although WLS
estimations should be used for ordinal scales, we used ML estimators. WLS requires a large
sample size. If the sample size is small (as in our case), the assumption of multinormality
holds, and if there are minor skewness and kurtosis (not exceeded | 1| ), ML estimators can
be used (Bollen 1989: 432).
3
 See the Appendix foor the results.
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model fits the data well (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1996)4. The overall model fit indices
exceeded .90.
Figure 1: Structural modela
Hypothesis 1 concern the effect of dependence on conflict. We expected that a
greater dependence asymmetry would result in more conflict. The results did not
support this relationship.
The second hypothesis involved the effect of dependence  on trust. The statistically
significant estimate of -.213 (p<.10) suggests support for this hypothesis. Thus, if
there is more dependence asymmetry, this will result in less trust. Hypothesis 3,
which suggested that trust lead to norms was supported. With an estimate of .739
(p<.01), this is a very strong relationship.
In hypotheses 4 and 5, we stated that a high level of trust and norms result in less
conflict. The data supported the hypotheses. The estimates of -.334 for the trust-
conflict relation and -.478 for the norms-conflict relationship were both significant
at p<.05. Hypothesis 6, that norms increase the performance evaluation of the
partners, was supported in this study. The estimate of .379 was statistically
                                                     
4
 The chi-square tests whether the implied (i.e. expected) interrelationships from
the model differ significantly from the observed interrelations between the
variables. Therefore, the chi-square measure should be non-significant.
A S Y M M E T R Y  O F
D E P E N D E N C E
T R U S T
C O N F L IC T
N O R M S
P E R F O R M A N C E
χ 2= 2 .8 5 , d f= 3 , p = .4 2 , A G F I= .9 3 , N F I= .9 8 , N N F I= 1 .0 0 , R M R = .0 4  
aS ta n d ard ize d  co e ff ic ie n ts ,  * p < .1 0 , * * p < .0 5 , * * * p < .0 1
.3 7 9 * *-.2 0 8
- .4 6 1 * * *
-.3 3 0 * *
-.0 6 3 - .2 1 3 *
.7 3 9 * * *
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significant. Finally, hypothesis 7 concerns the negative effect of conflict on the
joint venture performance. This relationship is not supported by the data, although
we found a negative, but not significant relationship of-.208.
’LVFXVVLRQDQGLPSOLFDWLRQV
In this study, we have tested a model, which explained the effect of dependence
asymmetry on the joint venture performance. It proved that conflict is not directly
influenced by the dependence asymmetry. Indirectly, dependence asymmetry
influences conflict by the concepts of trust and norms. The non-significant relation
between dependence and conflict implies that the bilateral deterrence theory for
explaining the dependence-conflict relationship might not be correct. It might be
needed to adjust the argument by integrating the potential effect of trust and norms.
Recently, Kumar et al. (1998) provided alternative theories (the conflict spiral, and
the relative power theory) to explain the relationship between dependence and
conflict in distribution channels. It could be interesting to see if their arguments
also hold for joint ventures.
We did not find a significant relationship for the conflict-performance relationship.
This might imply that the relationship is not direct, there might be a variable
between conflict and performance. Based on the article of Cullen et al. (1993), we
might expect that conflict does not directly influence the economic performance of
the joint venture but more the satisfaction of the partners. In their study, conflict
correlated negatively with satisfaction. Satisfaction was strongly correlated with
economic performance. In our interviews, we also found evidence for this relation.
A lot of intense conflict will lead to a kind of frustration of the partners. This does
not necessarily have to result in a bad economic performance. Based on the
dissatisfaction, the partners will more closely monitor the joint venture and the
partner. This will result in a poor economic performance. Killing (1983) described
this process as the failure process of joint venture. Also Anderson (1990) argued
that satisfaction is an antecedent of long-term economic performance.
Related with this is that conflict might not be something negative. The resolution of
conflict is very important and might even result in a better relationship between the
partners. We only look at the level and intensity of conflict and not the way the
conflicts were resolved.
Another explanation might be the conceptualisation of our conflict concept. Based
on its measurement characteristics, it could not be tested with the usual methods
based on association. Although the measurement history is good (see e.g. Habib
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1987, Cullen et al. 1993), the nomological validity proved to be problematic. Our
conflict operationalisation focuses on certain topics that might be present in a joint
venture. This can be very specific. The other concepts are more broadly
formulated. It would be interesting to see if other operationalisations of conflict
would perform better in our model.
&RQFOXVLRQ
The primary objective of our study was to investigate the effect of interdependence
asymmetry on the management of the joint venture and the perception of the joint
venture performance. In our model, we focused on the effect of conflict and the
cooperation between the partners (measured by the level of trust and norms) on the
performance of the joint venture. We found evidence that the level of trust and
norms are important for a successful joint venture. If the level of trust and norms is
high this will lead to a better performance of the joint venture and lower levels of
conflict. Contrary to our expectation, conflict is not directly influenced by the
interdependence asymmetry and does not influence the economic performance.
Based on our findings, we might conclude that managers who are responsible for
joint ventures should focus on the development of a relationship with their
partners. The dependence position can be best managed by focussing on the
relationship development. The joint venture must by structured in such a way that
the relationship can be built up. A good relationship can be very important to
survive difficult times and will result in better economic performance.  A good
relationship not only leads to better performance but also leads to a lower level of
conflict that might require scarce management time.
Though this study addresses cooperation and conflict issues of JVs to identify the
antecedents of performance, the findings should be evaluated in the light of the
following limitations. First, the study used cross-sectional data, thus preceding an
explanation of the dynamic effects of asymmetry of dependence, conflict, trust,
norms of exchange and performance. This becomes particularly crucial because
two-way causal links have been suggested in the literature, for example, improved
performance may also build norms of exchange. Further research is encouraged to
investigate the longitudinal relations in a quantitative approach. Second, our results
were based on information obtained from only one side of the JV. As some
variables in the study were bilateral, data collection from only one partner did not
capture all aspects of the relationship, and the findings should be interpreted
accordingly. Third, the conflict- performance relationship proved to be more
15
complex than formulated in our hypotheses. Perhaps the occurrence of conflicts
does not necessarily have to harm the performance. The effect might dependent on
the way the conflict is resolved (De Dreu & Van de Vliert 1997). Fourth, the
environment the joint venture is in might influence the relationships we suggested.
A turbulent environment might demand a more flexible attitude of the partners than
a stable environment. Finally, we only investigated a few variables that might
predict the performance of the joint venture. Further research is encouraged to see
the effect of other variables like shared objective and the control structure of the
joint venture.
5HIHUHQFHV
Andaleeb, SS (1992), The trust concept: Research issues for channels of
distribution, 5HVHDUFKLQ0DUNHWLQJ, 11, pp. 1-34
Andaleeb, S.S. (1995), Dependence relations and the moderating role of trust:
Implications for behavioural intentions in marketing channels, 5HVHDUFK LQ
0DUNHWLQJ, 12, pp. 157-172
Anderson, E. (1990), Two firms, one frontier: On assessing joint venture
performance, 6ORDQ0DQDJHPHQW5HYLHZ, Winter, pp. 19-30
Anderson, E., and B.A. Weitz (1989), Determinants of continuity in convential
industrial channel dyads, 0DUNHWLQJ6FLHQFH, vol 8 (fall), pp. 310-323
Anderson, J.C., & D.W. Gerbing (1988), Structural equation modelling in practice:
A review and recommended two-step approach, 3V\FKRORJLFDO %XOOHWLQ, 103,
pp. 411-423
Anderson, J.C., & D.W. Gerbing (1992), Assumptions and comparative strengths
of the two-step approach: Comment on Fornell and Yi, 6RFLRORJLFDO0HWKRGV	
5HVHDUFK, 20 (3), pp. 321-333
Anderson, J.C., & J.A. Narus (1990), A model of distributor firm and manufacturer
firm working partnerships, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ, 54 (April), pp. 42-58
Armstrong, J.S., & T.S. Overton (1977), Estimating non-response bias in mail
surveys, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ5HVHDUFK, 14 (August), pp. 396-402
Bacharach, S.B., & E.J. Lawler (1981), %DUJDLQLQJ3RZHUWDFWLFVDQGRXWFRPHV,
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Beamish, P.W. (1988), 0XOWLQDWLRQDO MRLQW YHQWXUHV LQ GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV,
London: Routledge
16
Beamish, P.W., and A. Delios (1997), Incidence and propensity of alliance
formation, In P.W. Beamish and J.P. Killing (eds), &RRSHUDWLYH VWUDWHJLHV
$VLDQ3DFLILFSHUVSHFWLYHV, San Francisco: New Lexington Press
Blau, P.M. (1964), ([FKDQJHDQGSRZHU LQVRFLDO OLIH, New York: John Wiley &
Sons Inc.
Bollen, K.A. (1989), 6WUXFWXUDOHTXDWLRQVZLWKODWHQWYDULDEOHV, New York: Wiley
Bollen, K.A., and R. Lennox (1991), Conventional wisdom on measurement: A
structural equation perspective, 3V\FKRORJLFDO%XOOHWLQ, 110(2), pp 305-314
Boyle, B., F.R. Dwyer, R.A. Robicheaux, & J.T. Simpson (1992), Influence
strategies in marketing channels: Measures and use in different relationship
structures, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ5HVHDUFK, 29 (Nov.), pp 462-473
Bucklin, L.P., and S. Sengupta (1993), Organizing successful co-marketing
alliances, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ, vol 57 (April), pp. 32-46
Contractor, F.J. and P. Lorange (1988), Why should firms cooperate? The strategy
and economics basis for cooperative ventures, in Contractor, F.J., and P.
Lorange, &RRSHUDWLYH 6WUDWHJLHV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %XVLQHVV, Massachu-
setts/Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington Books
Cook, K.S., & R.M. Emerson (1978), Power, equity and commitment in exchange
networks, $PHULFDQ6RFLRORJLFDO5HYLHZ, 43, pp. 721-739
Cullen, J.B., J.L. Johnson, and T. Sakano (1995), Japanese and local partner
commitment to JVs:, Psychological consequences of outcomes and investments
in the JV relationship, -RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV6WXGLHV, (1), pp. 91-115
Dabholkar, P.A., W.J. Johnston, & A.S. Cathey (1994), The dynamics of long-term
business-to-business exchange relationships, -RXUQDO RI WKH $FDGHP\ RI
0DUNHWLQJ6FLHQFH, 22 (2), pp. 130-145
Delwel (1993, 1994), Fusies en overnames, Delwel, Dordrecht
Dreu, C. de, & E. vasn de Vliert (ed) (1997), 8VLQJ FRQIOLFW LQ RUJDQL]DWLRQV,
London: Sage Publications
Dwyer, F.R., P.H. Schurr, & S. Oh (1987), Developing buyer-seller relationships,
-RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ 52 (April), pp. 21-34
Fornell, C., & Y. Yi (1992), Assumptions of the two-step approach to latent
variable modelling, 6RFLRORJLFDO0HWKRGV	5HVHDUFK, 20 (3), pp. 291-320
Ganesan, S. (1994), Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer seller
relationships, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ, vol 58 (April), pp. 1-19
Geringer, J.M. (1988), -RLQW YHQWXUH SDUWQHU VHOHFWLRQ 6WUDWHJLHV IRU GHYHORSHG
FRXQWULHV, New York: Quorum Books
17
Geringer, J.M., and L. Hebért (1991), Measuring performance of international joint
ventures, -RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV6WXGLHV, (2), pp. 249-263
Geyskens, I., & J.B. Steenkamp (1995), An investigation into the joint effects of
trust and interdependence on relationship commitment, In: M. Bergadaa (ed.),
0DUNHWLQJWRGD\DQGIRUWKHVWFHQWXU\SURFHHGLQJVWK(0$&FRQIHUHQFH
pp. 351-371
Geyskens, I., J-B E.M. Steenkamp, and N. Kumar (1998), Generalisations about
trust in marketing channel relationships using meta-analysis, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
-RXUQDORI5HVHDUFKLQ0DUNHWLQJ, vol 15, pp. 223-248.
Glaister, K.W., & P.J. Buckley (1998), Management-performance relationships in
UK joint ventures, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV5HYLHZ, vol 7, pp. 235-257
Granovetter, M.S. (1985), Economic action and social structure: The problem of
embeddedness$PHULFDQ-RXUQDORI6RFLRORJ\, 91, pp. 481-510
Habib, G.M. (1987), Measures of manifest conflict in international joint ventures,
$FDGHP\RI0DQDJHPHQW-RXUQDO, 30 (4), pp. 808-816
Håkansson, H., & J. Johansson (1988), Formal and informal cooperation strategies
in international industrial networks, In: F.J. Contractor & P. Lorange,
&RRSHUDWLYH6WUDWHJLHVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV, Massachusetts/Toronto: D.C.
Heath and Company/Lexington Books, pp. 369-379
Han, S.L. (1992), Antecedents of buyer-seller long-term relationships: An
exploratory model of structural bonding and social bonding, 3HQQVWDWH
8QLYHUVLW\,6%0UHSRUW
Harrigan, K.R. (1986), 0DQDJLQJ IRU MRLQW YHQWXUH VXFFHVV, Massachusetts,
Lexington Books, Lexington
Heide, J.B., & G. John (1992), Do norms matter in marketing relations?, -RXUQDORI
0DUNHWLQJ, 56, pp. 32-44
Heide, J.B., and G. John (1988), The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding
transaction specific assets in conventional channels, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ, vol
52 (Jan), pp. 20-35
Hyder, S.A. (1988), 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOMRLQWYHQWXUHUHODWLRQVKLSV$
ORQJLWXGLQDO VWXG\ RI H[FKDQJH RI UHVRXUFHV FRQWURO DQG FRQIOLFWV, Uppsala:
Uppsala Reprocentralen, HSC
Inkpen, A.C., & J. Birkenshaw (1994), International joint ventures and
performance: An interorganizational perspective, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %XVLQHVV
5HYLHZ, 3 (3), pp. 201-217
18
Jagersma, P.K., and J. Bell (1992), Internationale joint ventures; een empirische
analyse, (FRQRPLVFKH6WDWLVWLVFKH%HULFKWHQ, 77-3884, pp. 1064-1068
Johnson, J.L., G.S. Black, & T. Sakano (1993), The consequences of culture and
conflict in international strategic alliances, In: P.R. Varadarajan & B. Jaworski
(eds.), 0DUNHWLQJ WKHRU\ 	 DSSOLFDWLRQV, vol. 4, AMA winter educator’s
conference, pp. 32-37
Jöreskog, K., and D. Sörbom (1996), /LVUHO 8GHU¶V UHIHUHQFH JXLGH, Chicago:
Scientific Software International Inc.
Killing, J.P. (1983), 6WUDWHJLHVIRUMRLQWYHQWXUHVXFFHVV. Kent: Croom Helm ltd
Kumar, N., L.K. Scheer, and J.B. Steenkamp (1995), The effects of perceived
interdependence on dealer attitudes, -RXUQDO RI 0DUNHWLQJ 5HVHDUFK, vol 32
(August), pp. 348-356
Kumar, N., L.K. Scheer, & J.B. Steenkamp (1998), Interdependence, punitive
capability, and the reciprocation of punitive actions in channel relationships,
-RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ5HVHDUFK, 25 (Feb), pp. 225-235
Lorange, P., & G.J.B. Probst (1987), Joint ventures as self-organizing systems: A
key to successful joint venture design and implementation, &ROXPELD-RXUQDORI
:RUOG%XVLQHVV 2 (2), pp. 71-77
Madhok, A. (1995), Opportunism and trust in joint venture relationships: An
exploratory study and a model, 6FDQGLQDYLDQ-RXUQDORI0DQDJHPHQW vol 11,
pp. 57-74
Mohr, J., & R. Spekman (1994), Characteristics of partnership success: Partnership
attributes, communication behavior, and conflict resolution techniques,
6WUDWHJLF0DQDJHPHQW-RXUQDO, 15, pp. 135-152
Morgan, R.M., & S.D. Hunt (1994), The commitment-trust theory of relationship
marketing, -RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ, 58 (July), pp. 20-38
Parkhe, A. (1993), “Messy” research, methodological predispositions, and theory
development in international joint ventures, $FDGHP\RI0DQDJHPHQW5HYLHZ,
18 (2), pp. 227-268
Pfeffer, J., & G. Salancik (1978), 7KHH[WHUQDOFRQWURORIRUJDQL]DWLRQV$UHVRXUFH
GHSHQGHQFHSHUVSHFWLYH, New York: Harper & Row
Pilling, B.K., L.A. Crosby, & D.W. Jackson (1994), Relational bonds in industrial
exchange: An experimental test of the transaction cost economic framework,
-RXUQDORI%XVLQHVV5HVHDUFK, 30, pp. 237-251
19
Powell, W.W. (1990), Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of
organization, In: Staw & Cummings, 5HVHDUFKLQ2UJDQL]DWLRQDO%HKDYLRU, 12,
pp. 295-336, Jai Press
Steenkamp, J-B.E.M., and H.C.M. van Trijp (1991), The use of LISREL in
validating marketing constructs, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO -RXUQDO RI 5HVHDUFK LQ
0DUNHWLQJ, 8, pp. 283-299
Stern and El-Ansary (1992), 0DUNHWLQJFKDQQHOV, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall
Stinchombe, A.L. (1986), Norms of exchange, In: A.L. Stinchcombe (ed.),
6WUDWLILFDWLRQ DQG RUJDQLVDWLRQ 6HOHFWHG SDSHUV, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 231-267
Yan, A., and B. Gray (1994), Bargaining power, management control, and
performance in United States-China joint ventures: A comparative case study,
$FDGHP\RI0DQDJHPHQW-RXUQDO, 37 (6), pp. 1478-1517
$SSHQGL[
5HVRXUFHQHHGV
importance (1= completely unimportant, 5= very important) * relative contribution
(-2 = entirely partner, 0 = equal, 2= entirely own company)
Market access/knowledge of local market, Technology, Access to capital, Access
to distribution channels, Access to raw materials, Access to human resources,
Local identity, Contact with government, Management know-how
$OWHUQDWLYHV (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree)
It is difficult to replace our partner.
We have many alternative ways of replacing our partner. (r)
We are dependent on our partner.
7UXVW CFA results (two factor model) χ2(12)=19.46, p=.08, AGFI=.87, NNFI=.95,
CFI=.97
FUHGLELOLW\ (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree, α=.79)
We can count on our partner being honest.
Our partner always keeps promises.
We accept explanations that seem unlikely because we are sure that our partner is
telling the truth.
Our partner provides information that later turns out to be incorrect. (r)
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EHQHYROHQFH (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree, α=.83)
Our partner has an understanding of our problems.
When taking decisions about the joint venture, our partner takes the consequences
for our company into account.
We can count on our partner’s support in matters that are important to our
company.
1RUPVCFA results χ2(9)=15.95, p>.05, AGFI=.86, NNFI=.96, CFI=.94
The partners have a flexible approach.
Adjustments in the relationship are possible in order to react to changed
circumstances.
The other party is provided with all information that may be of interest to it.
Information is also exchanged informally and not only on the basis of a
predetermined agreement.
Solving problems within the joint venture is seen as a joint responsibility.
Both partners work for improvements that benefit the joint venture and do not only
concentrate on their own advantage.
&RQIOLFW (importance and intensity)
Strategic policy of jv, day-to-day policy, agreements between partners and jv,
performance measures of jv, role and function of parties, interpretation of jv
contract, distribution of advantages and disadvantages (know-how, financial).
3HUIRUPDQFH (1= completely disagree, 5= completely agree, α=.85)
CFA results χ2(1)=.05, p=.82, AGFI=.99, NNFI=1.03, CFI=1.00
The joint venture is more profitable than expected.
In general, we regard the joint venture as successful.
The joint venture’s products have not achieved the intended market share. (r)
(r) = reverse code
